Abstract. Benchmarking practices have rapidly diffused throughout the globe in recent years. This can be traced to their popularity amongst non-state actors, such as civil society organisations and corporate actors, as well as states and international organisations (IOs). Benchmarks serve to both 'neutralise' and 'universalise' a range of overlapping normative values and agendas, including freedom of speech, democracy, human development, environmental protection, poverty alleviation, 'modern' statehood, and 'free' markets. The proliferation of global benchmarks in these key areas amounts to a comprehensive normative vision regarding what various types of transnational actors should look like, what they should value, and how they should behave. While individual benchmarks routinely differ in terms of scope and application, they all share a common foundation, with normative values and agendas being translated into numerical representations through simplification and extrapolation, commensuration, reification, and symbolic judgements. We argue that the power of benchmarks chiefly stems from their capacity to create the appearance of authoritative expertise on the basis of forms of quantification and numerical representation. This politics of numbers paves the way for the exercise of various forms of indirect power, or 'governance at a distance', for the purposes of either status quo legitimation or political reform.
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Introduction
Global benchmarking comprises a distinct type of transnational practice in contemporary world politics, which involves the development and application of comparative metrics of performance. While benchmarking is not in itself a new phenomenon, the last three decades have been marked by a sharp increase in the density, complexity, and coverage of global benchmarking practices.
1 Much of this ongoing trend can be traced to the globalisation of an 'audit explosion' that began in the 1980s in domestic political contexts, and which has had farreaching ramifications for both public and private processes of transnational governance. 2 Other key contributing factors include the rapid proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in areas such as human rights, health, gender, and the environment, together with a parallel shift from state to private regulation at a corporate level. 3 Even the 'ivory tower' of academia is increasingly governed through ratings, rankings, and measurements of how well higher education institutions perform in comparison to their competitors. 4 These and other developments have not only dramatically expanded the pool of prospective 'benchmarkers'. They have also fostered an environment where benchmarks have gained considerable legitimacy and authority.
In its most basic form, benchmarking involves the classification of relative performance or value. In this article and for the Special Issue, benchmarking is used as an umbrella term for a wide range of comparative evaluation techniques -such as audits, rankings, indicators, indexes, baselines, or targets -which systematically assess the performance of actors, populations, or institutions on the basis of standardised measurements, metrics, and rankings. More specifically, benchmarking involves one or more of the following forms of comparative assessment:
(1) quality of conduct, or how well actors have discharged their responsibilities in specific areas; (2) quality of design, or how well specific policies, laws, or institutions have been formulated and applied; and (3) quality of outcomes, or how well activities in specific areas align with defined goals (irrespective of who is actually responsible for the overall outcomes).
In this article we identify and analyse a number of core features of benchmarking as a distinct mode of governance in world politics. We begin our analysis by locating global benchmarking within an emerging literature that focuses on how and why both states and nonstate actors have sought to regulate and shape transnational issues through indirect forms of power, rather than through direct compulsion. Building upon this literature, we argue that benchmarking can be best understood as an exercise in 'governing at a distance', wherein the power of benchmarks primarily stems from their capacity to indirectly shape procedural standards, issue expertise, institutional obligations, and political conversations. Much of the power of benchmarking is bound up in the mechanics and effects of ranking and quantification, which in turn generate a form of 'constructed objectivity' that acts back upon the reality it aims to describe. 5 The recent popularity of benchmarks can also be traced to their capacity to promote otherwise highly contentious policy goals and political agendas by means of rhetorical appeals to the ostensibly neutral language of technocratic assessment and numerical comparison. Complex social phenomena become legible by means of quantification, extrapolation, and simplification. Concepts such as freedom, development, and democracy, which academics routinely describe as essentially contested, instead appear as fixed, unproblematic, and reified categories.
We have divided this article into four main sections. The first section briefly situates our approach to global benchmarking within the larger context of existing literatures in
International Relations (IR) on political activism and norms, rational design and institutions, and governmentality and expertise. In the second section, we focus upon the mechanics and Much of the recent proliferation of global benchmarks can be traced to their perceived capacity to help build the reputation of specific organisations as 'issue experts'. 24 The popularity of benchmarking as a strategic tool for producing authoritative expertise -or at least the public appearance of expertise -is most notable in relation to NGOs and some IOs, which frequently find themselves in competition with their peers for allies, attention, and resources. 25 Thanks to the digital revolution of the last two decades, 26 The literature on governmentality is especially useful for the insight that benchmarking functions to make diverse forms of behaviour legible and amenable to intervention. 38 However, existing applications of governmentality, which mostly analyse techniques of government in domestic contexts, cannot simply be stapled on to analyses of the transnational arena. Among other things, transnational governance initiatives are characterised by a high degree of variation in both the rate and the form of implementation across different jurisdictions. 
Translating normative values into numerical representations
Global benchmarking tends to be heavily reliant upon rhetorical appeals to authoritative what A wants), 41 global benchmarks usually operate by orienting how specific actors: (1) conceptualise their options, obligations, and opportunities; and (2) seek to legitimate and justify their performance and perceived relative standing. It is in within this context that benchmarking practices can be regarded as an exercise in governance at a distance, which combines indirect power, expert authority, and transnational governmentality. This also means that the political effects of benchmarking tend to be cumulative and subtle, rather than overt and immediate, but they can nonetheless have a major influence over processes of agenda-setting in transnational governance.
The recent proliferation of global benchmarks owes a major debt to the political and popular appeal of numbers as information shortcuts, whereby complex and contested normative values are translated into simplified numerical representations. This process of translation not only helps to obscure their normative foundations, it also enables non-experts to make crude comparisons of relative performance regarding complex phenomena at a transnational level.
This translation process is common to all forms of benchmarking, and can be divided into four distinct components:
42
• simplification and extrapolation
Simplification and extrapolation are preconditions of quantification. Simplification comes in many different forms, but the most common denominator is when complexity and contextual detail is 'lost in translation' in the pursuit of quantification and comparability. Since not every sphere of human activity can be easily quantified, benchmarking efforts have a tendency to gravitate towards behaviours that can be more easily and effectively translated into a numerical form, and thereby end up generating data that is chiefly based upon a narrow subset of contributing factors. Simplification also tends to overlook context-specific idiosyncrasies and histories in favour of an emphasis upon more general properties. Commensuration therefore imposes a form of homogeneity among disparate entities that is imagined to be 'a property of the object rather than something produced by quantification'.
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In addition, there are further advantages associated with the 'neutrality' and 'objectivity' commonly ascribed to numerical rankings and representations. 'Numbers are not like words, which require interpretation', but are instead widely perceived to present unbiased facts.
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There is a widespread tendency to fixate on specific numerical claims, which create 'anchoring effects' by establishing referents that shape how people later conceptualise specific issues.
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These 'anchoring effects' also underpin the capacity of numbers to generate information in a format that can be more easily and quickly assimilated by non-expert audiences, who might otherwise be overwhelmed by qualitative and contextual detail.
Commensuration requires fixed, stable, and universal categories. These are generated by means of reification, which refers to the translation of complex phenomena into observable and Therefore, it often remains a mystery how specific conclusions were reached. This backstory routinely gets obscured once numbers are put into the public domain.
In many cases, the main political and institutional advantages associated with creating and disseminating benchmarks are political and organisational, rather than analytical. Global benchmarks have not only become relatively cheap and easy to produce and disseminate, they have also become increasingly popular among funders and donors eager to capture media attention. Most benchmarking does not involve years of expertise in the field, or contextual knowledge of local languages, customs, and social norms. Instead, all that is often required is the capacity to compile and process different forms of secondary data, which may simply involve aggregating and transposing information from one benchmark in order to create
another.
The politics of global benchmarking
Global benchmarking typically relies on productive forms of indirect power to provoke reactions from target actors, with 'productive power' understood as the 'socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification'. 50 Much of the value of benchmarking, at least from a public relations or political activism standpoint, stems from the fact that benchmarks can play a key role in both stimulating and structuring political conversations regarding: (1) the dimensions, ramifications, and salience of a given set of issues;
(2) how the performance of specific actors compares with that of their peers; and (3) how the performance of specific actors has changed with the passage of time. Benchmarking practices also tend to provoke politically motivated conversations around questions of methodology, whereby the credibility of particular measures is either impugned or defended depending on whether the results align with the political and economic agendas of the various actors involved.
While benchmarks purport to describe 'things as they are', this veneer of numerical representation and neutral comparison invariably conceals a range of political calculations, agendas, interests, and effects. Any overall assessment of 'good' or 'bad' performance requires a series of prior normative judgements regarding the types of activities, institutions, or categories that merit being subjected to benchmarking in the first place. provide a strong rationale for political action, they can exert a significant influence as a means to 'legitimate policy goals, the choice of target populations, and policy tools'.
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The degree of analytical and methodological rigour that underpins the construction of global benchmarking regimes cannot sufficiently explain why they have emerged as such a popular mode of transnational governance. A more compelling explanation is that the growth of global benchmarking reflects a dynamic 'benchmarking market'. This is tied to growing demand for benchmarks as a form of 'evidence' to enhance broader processes of governance, such as the effective allocation of official development assistance, the identification of internal security threats, enhancing accountability mechanisms in transnational governance, tracking standards of corporate behaviour, or monitoring national compliance with international policy regimes.
There will therefore be occasions when 'the demand for numbers generates a supply'. 61 Yet while rank orderings of conduct, institutional design, and economic, social, and political outcomes may fulfil a functional need for existing processes of transnational governance, they also produce new power relations wielded by one group of actors over others.
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The practice of global benchmarking is a prime example of transnational governance that works via knowledge practices rooted in authoritative expertise in order to extend power over disparate objects and subjects. 63 However, benchmarking is distinct from other forms of expert authority commonly utilized by state institutions and international organisations, because of the opportunities it provides for non-state actors -whether civil society organisations or corporate agencies -to employ knowledge practices in an attempt to limit or alter how public authority is used. It is therefore important to unpack the practice of global benchmarking into different types to gain a more fine-grained understanding of how various forms of benchmarking, promulgated by different types of actors, intersect, overlap, and compete with each other across contemporary processes of transnational governance. 
A typology of global benchmarking
In Table 2 we distinguish between four types of global benchmarking practices: (1) statecraft;
(2) international governance; (3) private market governance; and (4) transnational advocacy. 64 This divides benchmarking practices into types based on the class of actor that is engaged in benchmarking, namely states, international organisations, profit-based private institutions, and non-profit private institutions. We use the public-private distinction as a 'category of analysis'
to denote the different forms of accountability and capacities of various benchmarkers, rather than as a 'category of practice'. 65 While useful for heuristic purposes, these analytic divisions Type III benchmarking is a form of private market governance, which is undertaken by profit-based institutions and is one of the oldest forms of benchmarking. This includes sovereign credit rating, which has its roots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and internal measures of performance and quality control used by large firms (selfbenchmarking), 67 which has become increasingly significant as transnational corporations have spread their business activities worldwide through global production networks. Type IV benchmarking is either explicitly or implicitly geared towards transnational advocacy in particular issue areas, and is primarily conducted by civil society organisations and non-profit think tanks, but may also include work by individual academics or academic research centres.
In some instances Type IV benchmarking involves collaboration between non-profit institutions and profit-based institutions, and in particular media organisations, such as the
Index of Economic Freedom which is produced by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street
Journal. We further illustrate our typology of global benchmarking practices by briefly discussing a prominent example of each of type.
Benchmarking as statecraft
Benchmarking as statecraft can be conceived as a form of 'soft power' in world politics. comply with these minimum standards. 70 The data for the Report is based upon information from US embassies, government officials, non-governmental and international organisations, published reports, news articles, academic studies, research trips to every region of the world, and information submitted via email to report tips on human trafficking.
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In the decade and a half since it was established, the Trafficking in Persons Report has attracted substantial controversy and has been criticized for a lack of impartiality and political bias, with the US accused of acting as a 'global sheriff'. 72 States that have posed significant foreign policy problems for the US, such as Cuba and Venezuela, have typically received poorer rankings than otherwise broadly similar countries. Allies of the US with questionable records on human rights have historically received more positive assessments, although there has recently been a modest effort to correct this perception by shaming some US allies. 73 The US government has also recently found it necessary to include material on its own antitrafficking efforts, following sustained criticism that their own record was notably absent from the reports. While all benchmarkers invariably start with specific agendas of their own, it is not uncommon for annual benchmarking exercises to evolve in unexpected ways, or to produce unpredictable findings and outcomes that complicate the original motivations for introducing the benchmark.
The Report is widely recognised as a prime example of the use of benchmarking as an exercise in statecraft that seeks to compel global action in accordance with the expectations and agenda of the US government. 74 Despite the numerous flaws that have been identified in grade first drops below a socially significant threshold'. 76 Combating trafficking is a cause that comes with a host of practical problems and collateral damages, and it remains an open question whether the Report has helped or hurt in this respect. Nevertheless, this does not negate the larger point that this is a benchmark that has been globally influential. 77 
Benchmarking as international governance
The growth of benchmarking as international governance has gone hand in hand with the expansion of various forms of surveillance by international organisations of country performance over the last four decades. 78 The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators of corruption. 79 The data for the WGIs incorporates several hundred variables from 31 different data sources and is based on perceptions of governance quality drawn from public opinion and expert surveys, civil society organisations, profit-based information providers, and government agencies.
The conceptual validity, data accuracy, and substantive meaning of the WGI measures have been subject to strong criticism. 80 For example, to construct global benchmarks of governance quality, governance is defined as: Observers have highlighted the partial and biased view of governance quality that the definition used for the WGIs represents, emphasising in particular that the scale of aggregation involved in the production of the WGIs constitutes a trade-off between reliability and precision. Each of the data sources used to produce the WGIs suffers from specific quality problems. These problems are likely to be further complicated by aggregation processes, since the number and type of data sources differ both across countries and over time. 82 The WGIs implicitly assume a particular meaning of governance as a universally accepted standard. As Thomas points out, while most governments are likely to agree that the 'rule of law' is an important dimension of effective governance, for a liberal democracy this might be understood as 'a state constrained by rules' while an authoritarian dictatorship might understand this to mean 'citizen obedience to government edicts'. For these reasons, the WGIs have been criticized for not recognising that 'a governance indicator is a hypothesis about measurement and about the nature of governance'. 83 Nevertheless, as an example of Type II benchmarking the WGIs have resonated across a wide range of third parties, and have become particularly influential in decision-making processes over foreign aid allocations as a new form of policy conditionality. 84 
Benchmarking as private market governance
Benchmarking has become an increasingly prominent feature of national and transnational economic governance, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis when a large proportion of the pre-crisis ratings of financial assets produced by credit rating agencies were found to be inaccurate. 85 In particular, sovereign credit ratings represent one of the most controversial examples of benchmarking as private market governance. Credit ratings are evaluations of a debtor's ability to repay a loan and the probability of default. As a form of Standard and Poor's utilizes a mix of qualitative and quantitative measures in the five factors that constitute its sovereign ratings. These include: (1) a 'political score', which focuses on the quality of political and policymaking institutions, and external risks; (2) an 'economic score', which incorporates the degree of economic diversity, income levels, and growth prospects; (3) an 'external score', based on the international status of a country's currency, external liquidity, and foreign debt levels; (4) a 'fiscal score', based on assessments of the sustainability of budget deficits and public debt burden; and (5) a 'monetary score', which is based on inflation rates, the degree of flexibility in monetary policy, and the depth of domestic financial markets.
Standard and Poor's credit analysts assign a score for each of these five factors ranging from one (strongest) to six (weakest). 87 Once a sovereign credit rating is officially assigned to a country, ratings are then monitored on an ongoing basis and reviewed at least once a year.
Ratings issued by the three major agencies constitute a rank ordering of credit risk. 
Global benchmarking and third party users
The most influential users of each of these four types of global benchmarking are often third parties. These can be either public or private actors who may not be the formal target of a particular benchmarking exercise, but who incorporate benchmark scores produced by other actors into their decision-making processes and advocacy efforts. 96 This use by third parties can greatly expand the political traction of benchmarks by multiplying the reputational costs or benefits associated with specific rankings, and intensifying competitive pressures to improve poor performance.
Freedom House, for example, does not carry much independent weight as an organisation.
As an advocacy-oriented NGO, it is unable to use material incentives to induce compliance; its symbolic judgements on country performance do not imply the same potential for direct consequences as negative country reports issued by international organisations such as the World Bank or the IMF, and its claim to expert authority has been subject to strong reputational challenges on the basis of methodological weaknesses. 97 Nevertheless, its 'Freedom in the World' benchmark has acquired substantial weight owing to its alignment with the interests and agendas of third parties such as the US government and various international organisations, which greatly magnifies its audience and influence.
In such cases, the scientific expertise or institutional status of the benchmarker may be less consequential than what other parties do with their benchmark once it is produced. This underscores the need for more nuanced analyses of how global benchmarking links up with other transnational practices, as well as how benchmarks can potentially lead to unintended consequences. To gain a richer understanding of political effects of global benchmarking, it is therefore necessary to take into account: (1) the status and history of the specific organisation or individual that has produced a given benchmark; (2) the internal mechanics of how a given benchmark is produced; (3) the distinctive characteristics and political and economic profile of the specific issue being benchmarked; and (4) the authority and credibility that third party users can invest in benchmarks when they align with other political interests and agendas. 
